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Case No. 20150840-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

MANUEL ANTONIO LUJAN,
Defendant/Respondent.

Brief of Petitioner
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appeals in State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199 (Addendum A). The Supreme
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (West 2009).

INTRODUCTION
Kendall Oney couldn’t sleep and was sitting in the driver’s seat of his
car at 3:30 in the morning when Defendant opened the door and squatted
down, putting his exposed face mere inches away from Oney’s face.
Defendant looked directly at Oney and said, “Why you following me?“ The
dome light and the dashboard lights illuminated the pair as they looked at
each other. After several seconds, Defendant stood and reached toward
what Oney believed to be a weapon tucked in his waistband. Oney slowly

stood, putting the two once again face-to-face for several more seconds in
an area lit by two street lights, a porch light, a flood light, and the car’s
headlights. Oney spoke calmly and watched Defendant while at the same
time moving slowly around both Defendant and the car before bolting for
his house.

Defendant then stole Oney’s car.

Oney immediately called

police with a description of Defendant: a Hispanic male, about 5’10”, 180
pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black leather jacket and a black
beanie.
Within 20 minutes of Oney’s early morning call, officers had:
followed a leak from Oney’s driveway to the stolen car parked next to a
walkway that led to an elementary school; established a containment area
and a visible police presence; followed a canine from the car near the school;
discovered Defendant curled up inside a component of the school’s exterior
air conditioning unit; and obtained Oney’s positive identification of
Defendant. Defendant matched the description Oney gave police, including
height, weight, build, coloring, ethnicity, and clothing. He had a “scraggly”
salt and pepper goatee that had not been mentioned, and he had no hair
sticking out from under his beanie. When asked why he was there at the
school, Defendant stated, “[S]omebody is following me.” Oney thereafter
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identified Defendant as one of two familiar individuals at a lineup, then
positively identified him at the preliminary hearing and at trial.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted certiorari review on the following issues:
1. “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the district court’s denial of Respondent’s motion to suppress
eyewitness identification testimony.”
2. “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred
in holding the State was required to demonstrate that any error in
admission of the eyewitness identification was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, and whether it erred in concluding the admission of that
testimony was not harmless.”
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews decisions of the
court of appeals for correctness. Rahofy v. Steadman, 2012 UT 70, ¶7, 289
P.3d 534.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provision is reproduced in Addendum
B:

Utah Const. art. I § 12.

-3-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.
Defendant’s encounter with the victim—“Why you following me?”
Forty-year-old Kendall Oney was an amateur astronomer, familiar
with late-night and early-morning stargazing and used to getting up in the
very early morning. R357:15-18. So when he found himself unable to sleep
around 3:30 a.m. on November 25, 2012, he got out of bed. R357:15-18, 65.
The night was overcast, so he decided to use the time to get his car ready for
its annual inspection. R357:16-18, 22, 65.
As he sat in the driver’s seat in his driveway checking the starter,
gauges, and lights, he came face-to-face with Defendant, who opened the
driver’s door and squatted next to the seat looking directly at Oney.
R357:16-18, 29, 34-35, 74-77. His face was about ten inches from Oney’s face,
was not obscured by any covering, and was lit by the car’s “[f]airly bright”
interior lighting, which included both the dome and dashboard lights.
R357:17-18, 26, 35, 77. As Oney stared at Defendant’s face, Defendant asked,
“Why you following me? Why you following me?” R357:18, 35, 77.
Oney initially thought Defendant might want a drink or a ride.
R357:18. But after about ten seconds, Defendant stood up, opened his jacket
and reached for the handle of something tucked into his waistband.
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R357:18, 35-36, 39, 77.

The movement left Oney looking directly at

Defendant’s torso and hands, and upwards at his face.

R357:37-38, 78.

Oney’s surprise turned to fear, and he decided to get back to the house.
R357:18-19, 35, 41, 78, 81. He stood up, putting himself face-to-face with an
equally-tall Defendant and so close that the men were “almost touching.”
R357:37-38, 49-50, 101. At the same time, Oney started talking calmly to
Defendant, asking what was going on and if he was all right. R357:18-19,
35. For about five seconds, Oney moved slowly around Defendant and the
car as he talked, paying special attention to Defendant’s face and hands and
never losing sight of him. R357:36-38, 40-41, 82. Defendant moved with
Oney, ultimately moving into the car’s headlights. R357:36, 41, 51.
Oney saw Defendant as he stood up because of illumination from
multiple sources:
• the car’s headlights (R357:27);
• the porch light by the back door of the house about twenty feet away
(R357:29, 67-68; State’s Exh. 19);
• a street light at the front of Oney’s house about thirty yards away
(R357:32-35; State’s Exh. 9, 18);
• a street light in the front yard of the house behind Oney’s car about
thirty-five feet away (R357:33, 69-72; State’s Exh. 17);
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• a flood light on the house next door to the driveway about forty feet
away, which shown on Defendant from behind (R357:30-34; State’s
Exh. 16); and
• the reflection of the street lights and other lighting off the clouds
(R357:18, 26).
The trees were bare, allowing the multiple lighting sources to leave the area
“fairly well illuminated.”

R357:22-23, 26.

In fact, the circumstances

provided “pretty bright” lighting, allowing Oney to see Defendant and to
judge his movements. R357:19, 22, 25-26.
After about five seconds of maneuvering, Oney turned and ran for his
house. R357:19, 40-41. He immediately turned on the flood lights on the
back of his house, woke up his brother, and stepped back outside in time to
watch Defendant squeal away in his car to the end of the driveway before
turning north and speeding away. R357:19, 29-30, 42-43, 67-69, 90-91; State’s
Exh. 13, 14.
Defendant’s capture by police—“[S]omebody is following me.”
Oney called the police and gave a description of the car thief—a
Hispanic male, about 5’10”, 180 pounds, with long hair, and wearing a black
leather jacket and a black beanie.

R357:42-44, 50, 83-87, 91; R359:10-12.

Officer Shawn Bias responded from nearby within a minute of getting the
dispatch. R357:110, 117. While talking with Oney, Bias noticed a trail of
liquid on the ground leading from where the car had been parked to the end
-6-

of the driveway, then turning north the way Oney’s car had gone. R357:45,
119-20. The officer immediately left to follow the trail, which led directly to
Oney’s abandoned car a few blocks away.

R357:46-48, 119-20, 125-32;

R359:13; State’s Exh. 1. It was stopped at a curb a few blocks from Oney’s
house in front of a fenced concrete pathway leading to the schoolyard of an
elementary school. R357:120-21; State’s Exh. 21, 23, 24.
Because no more than ten minutes had passed since Oney’s call to
police, Bias believed that the suspect could still be nearby. R357:122-23.
The location and the officer’s years of experience led him to believe that the
suspect may have seen the police, abandoned the car, and hid. R357:124.
Consequently, the officer called for a K-9 unit to help locate the suspect and
for additional officers to set up a containment barrier to prevent his escape.
R357:122-23.
Officer Swazo and his dog arrived shortly after, and the dog wasted
no time picking up a scent and leading the officers “very strongly” from
Oney’s car to the nearby pathway, then down the pathway and across the
schoolyard toward the school. R357:125-29, 143-44; R359:17. Officer Swazo
handled the dog while Officer Bias followed behind him with his flashlight
on and gun drawn.

R357:128-29.

Officer Bias was mere feet into the

schoolyard when he heard a noise coming from the direction the dog was
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tracking. R357:129, 145; R359:17. It sounded to him like a person jumping a
chain link fence. Id.
Several portable classrooms—each an individual building—were
clustered next to the school building on the path the dog was tracking.
R357:128-30, 147; State’s Exh. 27 (showing where classrooms stood before
being removed). While Officer Suazo stopped the dog to do a routine safety
sweep around the classrooms to ensure no one was hiding there who might
ambush them, Officer Bias continued toward the school to follow the noise
he had heard, constantly looking around to ensure no one approached them
from the school. R357:129, 132-33; R359:17, 26-27. Near the building just
beyond the classrooms, he tracked a rustling noise to the heating/air
conditioning unit that was against the school wall and surrounded by a 9foot high chain link fence. R357:129; R359:17; State’s Exhs. 27 & 28 (in
Addendum C).

He did not yell for help because he did not want to

broadcast his location before he was ready. R357:130. Instead, believing
someone or something was inside the heating unit, he neared the unit,
identified himself, and ordered the person to come out.

R357:130, 148;

R359:17. Getting no response, he moved to within three feet of the unit and
found Defendant “curled into a ball” inside the heating unit. R357:129-30,
132-33, 148-49. Bias repeated his command numerous times, as did the
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other uniformed officers who joined him, but Defendant simply made eye
contact without complying with the orders. R357:130-33, 149; R359:28-29.
The only way in or out was a padlocked gate, suggesting Defendant had
scaled the fence. R357:130, 134. No other basis was found for the noise Bias
heard and no other people were found. Officers used a bolt cutter on the
lock, and Defendant eventually came out. R357:130; R359:18. When the
officer asked Defendant why he was hiding, Defendant said, “somebody is
following me.” R359:8. He claimed that he had called 911 to get police to
help him.
Bias concluded that Defendant matched the description of the car
thief “very well”—he appeared to be Hispanic and was wearing a black
beanie and a black jacket. R357:136-37, 141-42; R359:18. 1
The first identification
Within five minutes of Officer Bias’s visit, another officer drove Oney
to identify the abandoned car, then to the schoolyard where Oney positively
identified Defendant as the man who stole his car. R357:45-47, 49-51, 91-93,
135-36.

At the “showup”—held within thirty minutes of the crime—

Defendant was the only non-officer present, was in handcuffs, and was

A quick search of Defendant revealed no weapons, but a knife was
found on him during booking. R359:25-26, 29, 46, 94.
1
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illuminated with police spotlights. R357:49, 93-94; R359:22. However, Oney
identified him based on his looks, not the setting. R357:49-50, 94-95, 106-07.
Oney testified that Defendant was wearing the black jacket when Oney
identified him at the showup. R357:49-50.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
The second, third, and fourth identifications
The State charged Defendant with first-degree-felony aggravated

robbery. R1-3. At a lineup four months after Defendant’s arrest, Oney
selected Defendant (#6) and one of the other men (#8). R357:51-54, 60-62, 9597; State’s Exh. 43 & Def’s Exh. 1 (in Addendum C). At trial, he explained
that he recognized Defendant’s eyes, thought his goatee looked familiar,
and knew that he was the robber, but that one of the other men “looked
familiar,” prompting the dual identification. R357:62-64. Oney thereafter
positively identified Defendant at both the preliminary hearing and the
trial. R357:20.
The trial court’s ruling
Before trial, the judge admitted expert testimony from Dr. David
Dodd, PhD., concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identification
testimony. R89-108, 111-18, 142-44; R221; R356:passim. At the same time,
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the judge denied Defendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress all of Oney’s
identifications of Defendant. R54-55, 60-88; R356:75-76. The judge ruled:
THE COURT: Based upon what I’ve heard today, as well
as the fact that as I think about five to 7 minutes in this contest
– five to 7 –
[DEF CNSL] Seconds.
THE COURT: --seconds, excuse me, in this context, it
appears sufficiently enough under a dome light and otherwise
darkened area where it’s – it’s pre-lit to have at least the State in
this particular case … provided sufficiently reliable evidence to
suggest that – that identification should not be suppressed and
for the other factors that [the prosecutor] has articulated all of
which seem to be frankly compelling associated with the
identification. [sic] The Court finds that that test associated
with sufficiently reliable evidence to support the identification
has been met by the State. And the victim in this particular
case will be entitled to testify about what it is he identified on
that evening.
R356:75-76. The factors articulated by the prosecutor included:
• Oney and the suspect were face-to-face within a foot of each other for
5 to 7 seconds;
• the car’s dome light and dashboard lit Defendant’s face the entire
time;
• Oney kept his eyes on Defendant at all times until Oney reached the
front of the car where he turned and bolted for the house;
• Oney’s inability to sleep could have resulted from something other
than fatigue;
• the car had a fluid leak which led an officer to the abandoned car with
its door open;
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• a K9 sniffed the car’s area and led his handler up the nearby sidewalk
path through the schoolyard to the air conditioning unit outside the
school;
• an officer heard a fence rattle, followed the noise to the enclosed air
conditioning unit, and, using a flashlight, saw an individual inside
meeting Oney’s general description of the robber, including the
ethnicity, general height and weight, black beanie, and black jacket;
• the suspect’s first words to Oney were “Are you following me” or
“why are you following me,” and Defendant’s first words to officers
when found were “I’m being followed”;
• at 4:00 a.m. on a winter morning, Defendant was found within a
couple of miles of Oney’s home and near the abandoned stolen car;
• Defendant met the suspect’s general description;
• it is not reasonably likely that many individuals fitting the suspect’s
general description would be in the area at that time of day;
• Oney identified Defendant at the school within thirty minutes of the
robbery; and
• Dodd explained that even though certain details about an
identification could be wrong, it does not necessarily mean that the
identification itself is wrong.
R356:70-75. 2

Although the judge did not make express findings of fact regarding
the reliability of the identifications, he adopted as “compelling” the
prosecutor’s articulation of the factors set forth in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774 (Utah 1991). R356:75-76. Accordingly, this Court should assume that
the judge found the facts in accord with the prosecutor’s argument. See id.
at 787-88 (where “factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by
the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we ‘assume that
the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision.’”) (quoting Mower v.
McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (1952)).
2
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The prosecutor also reminded the court that an expert would guide
the jury on weighing each factor. R356:70. Finally, the trial court instructed
the jury about factors that may affect an identification’s accuracy. R308-11.
The defense
In an effort to undermine the reliability of Oney’s eyewitness
identification at trial, the defense focused on the differences between Oney’s
initial description of the robber and Defendant’s appearance when he was
arrested. Oney initially described the robber as having “long hair” sticking
out the bottom of his beanie “maybe an inch,” but Defendant had short,
almost shaved, hair. R357:85-86; State’s Exh. 43. Oney made no mention of
facial hair in his initial report and said at the preliminary hearing that he
saw no facial hair, but testified at trial that he remembered a goatee and that
the goatee was part of the reason he focused on Defendant at the lineup;
Defendant sported an untrimmed goatee when arrested. R357:63-64, 87-89,
136-37, 149-50; R359:11-12, 18-19. Officer Bias described it as “long scraggly
facial hair.” Where Oney consistently maintained that the robber wore a
black leather jacket during the robbery and at the arrest site, no jacket was
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inventoried when Defendant was booked, and none was produced at trial. 3
R357:43, 83-84, 106-07, 118; R359:52-53, 58, 69.
A jury convicted Defendant as charged.

R286.

Defendant was

sentenced and timely appealed to this Court, which transferred the case to
the court of appeals. R335-38, 340-41, 348-52.
The court of appeals’ ruling
In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a
new trial. See generally State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199. The majority
identified the five factors articulated in the 1991 case of State v. Ramirez,
conducted a simple balancing of some of those factors, and concluded that if
“Ramirez was an extremely close call, we are confident that here” the
testimony was “legally insufficient” to be deemed reliable. Id. at ¶¶12-15;
see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782-84 (Utah 1991). It based its ruling on
(1) the “troublesome” suggestiveness of the showup combined with the
racial difference between Defendant and the eyewitness; (2) differences in
Oney’s description of the robber the night of the robbery and at trial,
especially regarding the length of the robber’s hair and the existence of
facial hair; and (3) Oney’s failure to identify only Defendant at the lineup.
At least two police officers also remembered Defendant wearing a
black jacket when he was arrested early on a winter morning, suggesting
that the jacket was later misplaced. R357:141-42; R359:46-47.
3

-14-

Id. at ¶¶14-15. The majority ruled the evidence inadmissible, held that the
error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, vacated the conviction,
and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at ¶19.
Judge Pearce took the polar opposite position in his dissent, finding it
impossible to “squint at Ramirez’s holding in a way that permits [one] to see
how the identification testimony offered in this case is less reliable than the
testimony the Ramirez court deemed admissible.” Id. at ¶21 (Pearce, J.,
dissenting).

Judge Pearce reviewed each Ramirez factor, first under

Ramirez’s facts and then under the facts at hand; he acknowledged the same
“concerns” noted by the majority. Id. at ¶¶22-30. But, unlike the majority,
he determined that, in “almost all respects, the showup involving
Defendant in this case was substantially less troublesome than that the
Ramirez court approved.” Id. at ¶21.
Review of the first three factors led Judge Pearce to find that this case
fared better then Ramirez on each factor.
dissenting).

Id. at ¶¶24-26 (Pearce, J.,

Only the fourth factor—whether Oney’s identification was

made spontaneously and remained consistent—caused Judge Pearce
concern. Id. at ¶¶27-29. This factor included consideration of the consistency
of Oney’s descriptions of the robber. Oney was not fully consistent in his
identification of Defendant at the lineup where he identified both
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Defendant and another man as the robber, was inconsistent in his
description of Defendant’s facial hair, and was wrong in claiming
Defendant had long hair. Id. at ¶29. It was these inconsistencies, the judge
explained, that “present the only way in which this matter could be
considered a better candidate for reversal than Ramirez.” Id. Ultimately,
however, there were a “myriad” of other ways in which the testimony
admitted in Ramirez was more unreliable than the testimony excluded in
this case, prompting Judge Pearce to believe that the discrepancies were
insufficient to require reversal under Ramirez. Id.
Finally, Judge Pearce acknowledged that the showup in this case was
“troublesome,” as was the showup in Ramirez. Id. at ¶31. However, where
a similar showup did not render the eyewitness testimony in Ramirez
inadmissible, Judge Pearce found no basis for a different outcome in this
case. Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Eyewitness identifications. This Court should clarify its state due
process model governing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. At
the outset, the right to due process protects against the miscarriage of justice
resulting from state action. Absent police conduct causally related to the
identification, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor
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has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law. This Court should
also clarify that State v. Ramirez did not intend to eliminate the conditional
two-step approach of the federal model applied in Neil v. Biggers.
Under step one, trial courts must determine whether the police
identification procedure itself was suggestive, and if so, to what extent
(embraced in the fourth Long factor). If the procedure was not suggestive,
the evidence should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry from
the trial court. If the police identification procedure was suggestive, trial
courts proceed to step two.

In that step, trial courts must weigh the

remaining Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure to determine whether the identification was clearly unreliable.
The identification should be suppressed as constitutionally inadmissible
only if there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
Short of that, the identification should be submitted to the jury for its
consideration.
The showup by which Kendall Oney first identified Defendant as the
robber was suggestive but did not produce the victim’s identification of
Defendant. Instead, Oney testified that his identification of Defendant was
prompted by his recognition of the individual, not by the surroundings.
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And the witnessing conditions at the time of the crime were
imminently more reliable than in Ramirez. As a result, to the extent the
identification procedure was suggestive, it cannot be said that the
witnessing conditions were so poor that there was a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
II. Harmless Error. Should this Court rule that there was “a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” requiring exclusion
of the identification testimony, it must determine whether the error was
harmless. The court of appeals’ majority reached this issue and, for the first
time in this jurisdiction, applied the same standard used for a federal
constitutional due process error: harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The
standard should remain undecided in this jurisdiction because, even if the
federal standard applies, it was met here. Even without Oney’s eyewitness
identification of Defendant at the arrest site, the lineup, the preliminary
hearing, and the trial, a thorough review of the evidence reveals sufficient
compelling evidence of Defendant’s guilt to establish that admission of the
eyewitness identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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ARGUMENT
I.
ONEY’S IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT AS THE
ROBBER WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY ADMISSIBLE
The court of appeals majority held that Kendall Oney’s identification
of Defendant as the robber was constitutionally inadmissible under the state
due process standard articulated in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82
(Utah 1991).

State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶11-15.

The dissent

concluded otherwise, opining that if the identification testimony in Ramirez
was admissible, so too is the testimony in this case. Id. at ¶31.
Both the majority and the dissent urged review of the Ramirez
standard for the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony, citing
its age, the continuing legal and scientific concerns about the reliability of
eyewitness identifications, and the outcome in this case. Id. at ¶10, n.1; id. at
¶21 (Pearce, J., dissenting). This Court should clarify the state due process
standard announced in Ramirez and reverse the court of appeals.
***
For the most part, the federal constitution protects defendants from
convictions based on unreliable evidence, “not by prohibiting introduction
of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury
that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit.” Perry v. New
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Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 723 (2012) (emphasis added).

For example,

constitutional safeguards to counter unreliable evidence include “the Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel, compulsory process, and confrontation plus
cross-examination of witnesses.” Id. (citations omitted).
The same holds true under the Utah Constitution. Under article I,
section 12, defendants “have the right to appear and defend … by counsel,
… to be confronted by the witnesses against” them, and “to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses” on their behalf.
Utah Const. art. I § 12. And this Court has recently added to this arsenal of
weapons by requiring the admission of expert testimony on the fallibility of
eyewitness identifications in stranger identification cases.

See State v.

Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶49, 223 P.3d 1103 (“Clopten I”).
Typically, then, the reliability of evidence is left for the jury to test
through the crucible of trial, with all of its safeguards for determining the
truth. Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 723. There is a rare exception—when improper
police conduct renders the evidence so unreliable that its admission can be
said to deny a defendant his due process right to a fair trial. For example,
suppression is constitutionally required when a confession is prompted by
police interrogation techniques that “ ‘are so offensive to a civilized system
of justice that they must be condemned.’ ” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,
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¶11, 984 P.2d 1009 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,163 (1986)).
Similarly, suppression is constitutionally required where an identification
results from a police identification procedure that is “‘unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny the
accused a fair trial.’”

State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1985)

(emphasis added).
A. A defendant’s due process rights under the Utah Constitution
are not implicated absent State conduct.
At the outset, it is important to clarify that due process concerns
under the Utah Constitution do not arise absent State conduct. This Court
has never suggested that an eyewitness identification not prompted by the
police implicates state due process. Indeed, almost every case before this
Court that has addressed the state constitutional admissibility of an
eyewitness identification has involved at least an “arguably suggestive”
police identification procedure. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777-84 (addressing
admissibility of identification following one-person showup arranged by
police); see also State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ¶¶9-11, 29-64, 44 P.3d 794
(admissibility of identification following police lineup); State v. Hoffhine,
2001 UT 4, ¶¶7,13-19, 20 P.3d 265 (addressing admissibility of identification
following two-person showup arranged by police); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT
57, ¶¶7,41-47, 993 P.2d 837 (addressing admissibility of identification
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following police lineup); State v. Willett,

909 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1995)

(same); but see State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶¶8, 25-30, 48 P.3d 953
(concluding

that

police-administered

photo

array

presentation

not

suggestive).
This Court’s due process jurisprudence in other contexts has also
centered on the concern that government action may result in the
deprivation of a defendant’s due process right to fundamental fairness. For
example, the Court has held that due process concerns may arise when
prosecutors engage in “potentially abusive practices” against a criminal
defendant. See State v. Redd, 2001 UT 113, ¶20, 37 P.3d 1160. The Court has
likewise held that due process concerns may arise when a prosecutor
destroys or loses exculpatory evidence. See State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,
¶¶39-46, 162 P.3d 1106.

Due process concerns do not arise absent

government action.
This Court in Ramirez likened the standard by which the admissibility
of eyewitness identification evidence is determined to the standard applied
when considering the constitutional admissibility of a confession. Ramirez,
817 P.2d at 778. Under that standard, the trial court acts as a “gatekeeper to
carefully scrutinize proffered evidence for constitutional defects.”

Id.

Significantly, “ ‘[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession,

-22-

there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a
criminal defendant of due process of law.’ ” 4 Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶18
(quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164). This Court should thus recognize, that
absent police conduct related to an identification, there is no basis for
concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of state
due process of law.
As the United States Supreme Court recently explained in discussing
the federal model, “the potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not
alone render its introduction at the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”
Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 728. Simply put, “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence
does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process
rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before
allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.” Id. The purpose of the due
process requirement “is not to displace the adversary system as the primary
means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of
justice does not occur.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). That
is, a miscarriage of justice that results from State conduct. See Perry, 132
S.Ct. at 726 (observing that the very purpose of the “due process check” is

The Court has not articulated a state due process standard for
confessions different from the federal standard.
4
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“to avoid depriving the jury of identification evidence that is reliable,
notwithstanding improper police conduct”).
Absent some police misconduct, a defendant’s right to a fair trial is
fully protected by the constitutional safeguards of effective counsel,
compulsory process, confrontation, cross-examination, and the requirement
that the State prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at
728-29. Added to that, this Court has now recognized a defendant’s right to
call qualified experts to educate the jury on factors that may affect the
reliability of eyewitness identifications.

See Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶49.

These measures, together with the rules of evidence, are more than
sufficient to protect criminal defendants from convictions based on
unreliable evidence. See Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 729 (noting protection afforded
by eyewitness expert testimony recognized in Clopten I).
In sum, like federal due process, state due process does not require a
preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness
identification not prompted by police conduct.

Rather, the safeguards

against conviction based on unreliable evidence rest in the trial rights of
article I, section 12, and the rules of evidence.
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B.

Ramirez did not purport to abandon the conditional two-step
approach of the federal model.
Historically, Utah courts examined the constitutional admissibility of

an eyewitness identification under the federal due process standard. See
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779.

In Ramirez, the Court adopted a somewhat

different standard under state due process. Id. at 780. But the principle
underlying both standards remained the same—a suggestive identification
procedure administered by the police might render an identification so
unreliable that its admission can be said to deny a defendant his due
process right to a fair trial.
1. The federal due process model is a conditional two-step
analysis.
Before Ramirez, this Court had “simply applied the federal analytical
model for determining the reliability, and hence the admissibility” of an
eyewitness identification.

Id. at 779.

conditional two-step analysis.

The federal model involves a

As a threshold matter, a court must

determine whether the police used an “unnecessarily suggestive”
identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). If not, the court’s due process inquiry
ends. See id. But if police do employ an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure, the court proceeds to step two—it must determine
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“whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was
[sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure [employed
by police] was suggestive.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.
When assessing the reliability of a tainted identification under step
two of the federal model, courts must consider the “totality of the
circumstances” surrounding the tainted identification in light of five
reliability factors:
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, [2] the witness’ degree of attention, [3] the
accuracy of the witness’ description of the criminal, [4] the level
of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and [5] the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. The “Biggers
factors” are “weighed [against] the corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification itself” to determine whether “there is ‘a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 114, 116 (1977) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384
(1968)). If so, the identification is constitutionally inadmissible. But “[s]hort
of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh.” Id. at 116.
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2. Ramirez sought only to replace the Biggers factors with
the Long factors.
In purporting to follow Ramirez, the court of appeals applied a state
due process model not contemplated by Ramirez. Rather than applying a
conditional

two-step

analysis,

the

court

of

appeals

treated

the

suggestiveness of police identification procedures and the overall reliability
of an identification as a single inquiry which could result in suppression
under state due process. See Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶11-15.
In articulating its approach for determining the constitutional
admissibility of an identification, the court of appeals purported to do no
more than summarize the Ramirez analysis. See id. But Ramirez did not
suggest such a fundamental departure from the federal analysis. To be
sure, Ramirez broke “new ground under the Utah Constitution” in assessing
the constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identifications. Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 778.

But the state analytical model adopted in Ramirez only

“diverges somewhat” from the federal model. Id. Ramirez did not take
issue with the conditional two-step approach of the federal model. Rather,
it only faulted the federal standard used for judging the reliability of
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“arguably suggestive eyewitness identifications” under step two of the
federal model. 5 Id. at 779-81.
Ramirez rejected the Biggers factors for step two as “scientifically
unsupported” for assessing the reliability of an identification. Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 780. In their place, Ramirez required an appraisal of a suggestive
identification’s reliability based on the “different criteria” identified in State
v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986):
“(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor during
the event; (2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the
time of the event; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity;
(4) whether
the
witness’s
identification
was
made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether
it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event
being observed and the likelihood that the witness would
perceive, remember and relate it correctly.”
817 P.2d at 780-81 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). The Long factors, the
Court held, “more precisely define the focus of the relevant inquiry” into
reliability. Id. at 781.
The Ramirez court misapprehended the federal due process model in
one respect. The Court stated that the element of “suggestibility” included
in the fourth Long factor has “no comparable emphasis given to [it] by

Here, the court of appeals misinterpreted Ramirez to mean the
appropriate analysis under the state constitution consists of only step 2.
5
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Biggers.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. That is incorrect. Long’s “suggestibility”
inquiry is, in fact, the focus of step one under the federal due process model
and the subject against which the Biggers factors are weighed under step
two. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (“Against these factors is to be weighed
the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”).
In sum, Ramirez did not suggest that a trial court’s role in screening
identification evidence “for constitutional defects” includes a general
reliability analysis absent a suggestive police identification procedure. See
817 P.2d at 778. It “depart[ed] from federal case law only to the degree that”
some of the Biggers criteria rendered “the federal analytical model scientifically
unsupported.” Id. at 780 (emphasis added). But see Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶25
(suggesting that suggestive police procedures and general unreliability of
evidence are independent bases for excluding eyewitness identifications).
C. This Court should clarify its state due process analysis.
Because Ramirez did not purport to eliminate step one of the federal
analysis, this Court should clarify Ramirez to prevent further confusion
about and misapplication of the state due process analysis. This Court
should clarify that, like the federal due process model, the state due process
model involves a conditional two-step analysis incorporating the Long
factors.
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1. Step One—assessing the suggestiveness of the police
identification procedure.
First,

a

defendant

seeking

the

exclusion

of

an

eyewitness

identification must establish that police used an “unnecessarily suggestive”
identification procedure, Biggers, 409 U.S. at 197-99, or, at a minimum, an
“arguably suggestive” identification procedure, Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779. 6
This step embraces the fourth Long factor addressing “suggestibility.” See
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; Long, 721 P.2d at 493 (asking whether “witness’s
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter,
or whether it was the product of suggestion”). If a defendant meets that
burden, the court may proceed to step two.

But if not, the witness’s

identification should be submitted to the jury without further inquiry by the
trial court.
2. Step Two—weighing the Long factors against the
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure.
Second—if the defendant satisfies step one—the trial court should
then weigh the Long factors (except the fourth factor) against the
suggestiveness of the police identification procedure itself (as assessed
under the fourth Long factor). See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. The question

Ramirez could be read to imply that rather than showing that the
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the defendant need
only show that it was “arguably suggestive.” 817 P.2d at 779.
6
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here is “whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification
was [sufficiently] reliable even though the confrontation procedure
[employed by police] was suggestive.”

Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; accord

Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶30 (holding that proper inquiry is whether
identification “is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the jury
for their deliberation”).
This Court has held that in weighing the Long factors, trial courts
must determine whether the identification “was sufficiently reliable so as
not to offend defendant’s right to due process by permitting clearly
unreliable identification testimony before the jury.” Id. The Court has not
expounded on the “clearly unreliable” standard. But it appears to be the
equivalent of the federal due process standard—the defendant must show
“ ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ” Brathwaite,
432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384). It is a heavy burden, as
the outcome in Ramirez makes clear.

There, the Court held that the

eyewitness identification was sufficiently reliable notwithstanding the
“blatant suggestiveness” of the one-man showup and the relatively poor
witnessing conditions surrounding the crime (no one ever saw the
perpetrator’s full face). Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.

-31-

In sum, an eyewitness identification should be excluded only if the
weighing under step two results in a determination that notwithstanding
the suggestive police identification procedure, the identification was clearly
unreliable, i.e., “there is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.’ ” Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (quoting Simmons, 390 U.S. at
384).

Short of that, “[c]ourts need not, nor should they, step into the

province of the jury and decide the ultimate matter of identification for the
jurors.” Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶30.

It certainly should not do so as a

constitutional matter. This is particularly true where the constitution and
rules of evidence equip a defendant with the tools necessary to challenge
unreliable evidence.
D. Kenneth Oney’s identification of Defendant as the robber
was not constitutionally unreliable.
Like Ramirez, the showup identification of Defendant in this case was
suggestive. But unlike Ramirez, the eyewitness testified that it was not the
basis for his identification. And unlike Ramirez, the witnessing conditions
here were eminently more reliable. As the dissent noted, one has to “squint
at Ramirez’s holding” to conclude otherwise. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 21.
When the suggestiveness of the arrest-site lineup (Long’s fourth factor) is
weighed against the remaining Long factors, it cannot be said that there was
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a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. This Court
should thus reverse the court of appeal’s ruling to the contrary.
1. The arrest-site identification was at least arguably
suggestive.
As explained, the first step in the due process inquiry is whether
Oney’s identification of Defendant at the arrest site “‘was the product of
suggestion,’” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493), and if
so, to what extent. As explained, this inquiry embraces the fourth Long
factor. The variables subject to consideration under this inquiry are usefully
divided into two categories: (a) the circumstances of the identification
procedure itself that may be suggestive (procedural factors), and (b) witness
behavior that may signal that the identification was the product of
suggestion rather than memory (witness factors). A review of these
circumstances shows that Oney’s arrest-site identification was less
suggestive than in Ramirez. However, even if it was equally suggestive, the
inquiry does not end.
(a) Procedural factors of arrest-site identification.
Relevant factors in evaluating the circumstances surrounding the
identification procedure include “the length of time between observation
and identification, … the value of lineups compared to showups, the value
of photo identifications compared to in-person identifications,” and
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potentially suggestive police conduct, such as the instructions given to the
eyewitness by police, the composition of the lineup, the way in which the
lineup was carried out, and the behaviors of the person conducting the
lineup.” Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22; accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783
(citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494, n.8).
A showup is often considered “inherently suggestive because it
involves the presentation of a single suspect to a witness by the police (as
opposed to a lineup, in which several individuals are presented to the
police, only one of whom is the suspect).” Brisco v. Ercole, 565 F.3d 80, 88
(2nd Cir. 2009). Such was the case in Ramirez: the witness’s identification of
Ramirez “took place on the street in the middle of the night. Ramirez, with
dark complexion and long hair, was the only person at the showup who
was not a police officer. He stood with his hands cuffed to a chain link fence
behind his back. [And the] headlights of several police cars were trained on
him.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. The showup in Ramirez was a blatantly
suggestive procedure. Id.
As in Ramirez, the identification here was made soon after the
robbery—within 20 minutes—but that fact is a favorable factor. R357:106-07.
According to Defendant’s expert, a short interval improves accuracy.
R358:52. The field identification was also similar. Like Ramirez, Defendant
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was presented to Oney in the early hours of the morning, was the only nonofficer present, was handcuffed, was accompanied by police officers, and
was illuminated by the headlights of police cars. R357:49-51.
(b) Witness factors.
Relevant factors in evaluating witness behavior that might indicate an
identification was the product of a suggestive procedure include (1)
spontaneity and consistency in making the identification, (2) a weakened or
compromised mental capacity and state of mind at the time of the
identification, (3) “instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses to the
event failed to identify defendant,” and (4) “instances when the witness or
other eyewitnesses gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with
defendant.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781, 783. Witness confidence is another
relevant factor that may be examined. See State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ¶23,
133 P.3d 363 (holding that courts may also “weigh certainty testimony” in
assessing reliability, even though not required to be considered under
Ramirez).
No one established Oney’s state of mind at the time of the showup.
Oney said he was “pretty distraught” when police arrived within five
minutes of his call to 911. R357:91. He identified Defendant at the showup
approximately 20 minutes after that. R357:106-07. By that time, he had not
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only gotten an immediate response to his 911 call and explained the
situation to the officers, but he had recovered his stolen car. Such a fast and
positive development would go far in soothing any remaining anxiety.
Nothing suggested that he was emotional or distraught at the time. Further,
Oney made his identification from the safety and anonymity of the police
cruiser, eliminating any potential fear from the possibility of reprisal if the
suspect saw him. R537:93. When asked if Defendant was the robber, Oney
immediately answered “yes,” noting that it was “definitely him.” R357:9394, 135-36. No one suggested that he make a positive identification, and on
the way over he was simply told that they had “probably found the
suspect.” R357:91-92. Oney’s quick, positive identification suggests that it
was the product of memory, not suggestion. See Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶28
(recognizing that spontaneous identification supports finding of reliability).
Unlike Ramirez, he confirmed as much, explaining that he identified
Defendant because of his looks, not because of the setting in which the
identification took place. R357:49-50. 94-95, 106-07. And although witness
confidence is no guarantee of accuracy, Oney’s certainty was a factor that
made it slightly more likely that the identification was reliable. See Guzman,
2006 UT 12, ¶22 (recognizing eyewitness confidence as factor favoring
reliability).

-36-

Oney consistently identified Defendant as the robber after the
showup, although with somewhat less confidence at the lineup four months
later. He picked Defendant because he remembered his eyes and thought
his goatee looked familiar. R357:63-64. However, he hesitated because he
believed the robber would not be in the lineup based on a phone call he had
received the previous day and because he thought another person in the
lineup “looked familiar.” R357:60-64. Consequently, he chose both men.
Id. He later positively identified Defendant at the preliminary hearing and
at trial. See R355:5-6; R357:20. His partial identification may adversely
impact the reliability of his identification to some degree, but that is only
one of the relevant considerations.
Finally, the inconsistencies in Oney’s descriptions of the robber—the
hair, the jacket, and the goatee—were reasonably explained.

Through

Defendant’s expert, the prosecutor established that lighting and proximity
can both obscure or distort things. R358:56-57. And officers corroborated
the existence of the jacket at the arrest site.
In sum, the arrest-site identification procedure employed by police in
this case was less suggestive than the showup in Ramirez, where one of
three victims sat in a police car and positively identified Ramirez as the
masked man who robbed him earlier in the night while Ramirez was alone
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and chained to a fence at one in the morning in the headlights of police cars.
817 P.2d at 777. While the procedural factors of the arrest-site identification
paralleled those present in Ramirez, the witness factors demonstrate that
Oney’s identification was the product of memory, not suggestion. Most
significantly, unlike Ramirez, Oney expressly stated that his identification of
Defendant at the showup was based on his memory of the robber, not the
circumstances surrounding the showup.
But even if it were unnecessarily suggestive, when weighed against
the Long factors—which this Court in Ramirez found to be more scientifically
sound than the Biggers factors—it does not produce “a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 116
(citation and quotation omitted).
2. Witnessing conditions at the crime scene.
Even if the identification procedure were suggestive, an evaluation of
the Long factors against the suggestiveness of the identification procedure
(to whatever extent that was) establishes that the identification was
“sufficiently reliable so as not to offend defendant’s right to due process.”
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶30.
***
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As explained, step two requires courts to weigh the remaining Long
factors against the suggestive influence of the identification procedure.
Although Long identifies four remaining factors, they are better understood
as “witnessing conditions,” with the last two factors combining to reflect a
single condition: (1) “the opportunity of the witness to view” the
perpetrator during the crime; (2) “the witness’s degree of attention” to the
perpetrator at the time of the crime; and (3) the witness’s “capacity” to
reliably identify the perpetrator given “the nature of the event being
observed” and the witness’s “physical and mental acuity.” Long, 721 P.2d at
493. Courts should weigh these witnessing conditions to determine “the
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate” the event
correctly. Id.
(a) Opportunity to view robber during the robbery.
The first witnessing condition is the witness’s opportunity to view the
perpetrator during the crime. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. Relevant factors
include overall visibility, such as lighting and obstructions; the distance
between the witness and the actor; the length of time the witness viewed the
actor; and whether the witness could see the actor’s face, which may be
adversely affected if the actor is wearing a disguise, such as a mask, hat, or
sunglasses. Id. at 782; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22; Gary L. Wells,
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Amina Memon, & Stephen D. Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: Improving its
Probative Value, 7 Psychological Science in the Public Interest 45, 53-54 (2006)
(“Wells, Memon, & Penrod”); Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness
Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 277, 281 (2003) (“Wells & Olson”) (in
Addendum D).
Although the robbery occurred at 3:30 in the morning, Oney had
ample opportunity and ability to see the robber. His initial contact with the
robber occurred at close range—from about ten inches—within the confines
of Oney’s car door under the car’s “[f]airly bright” interior lighting. For a
full ten seconds, Oney was face to face with the robber’s undisguised face
under the dome and dashboard lights. When the two stood, Oney had the
benefit of several illumination sources in which to see the robber’s
unmasked face, including the car’s headlights, a nearby porch light, two
street lights, and a neighbor’s flood light. Although the lights were not
directed at the robber’s face, the bare trees permitted the maximum amount
of light from each source to reach the area, resulting in “pretty bright”
illumination. R357:18-19, 22-23, 25-29, 30-35, 67-72; State’s Exhs. 9, 16-19.
Oney kept his eyes on the robber throughout the ordeal, talking calmly to
him.

Standing face-to-face and almost touching, Oney moved slowly
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around the robber and the car, with the robber keeping pace with him and
ultimately moving into the car’s headlights.
Despite the close proximity, Oney did not initially mention
Defendant’s untrimmed salt and pepper goatee until expressly asked about
facial hair at the preliminary hearing. The omission does not necessarily
demonstrate that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable
identification. Officer Bias admitted cutting short his initial investigation
with Oney to follow the liquid trail left by the stolen car, suggesting Oney
may not have gotten to that part of his identification and did not need to
revisit it once Defendant was arrested. Until questioned about it at the
preliminary hearing, Oney had no reason to believe he had omitted
anything from his description of the robber. Moreover, while the lighting
and proximity were sufficient to see the robber’s face, they may have been
insufficient to permit Oney to see the delineation between Defendant’s face
and his “scraggly” salt and pepper facial hair.

See R358:56 (expert

admission that things may be obscured by close proximity); R358:57 (expert
opinion that features may be obscured depending on the lighting).

As the

lighting was not directed at the robber’s face throughout the ordeal, any
resulting shadows could effectively minimize the differences between the
robber’s face and his facial hair.
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Additionally, Oney described the robber as wearing a black beanie
that fit tight to his skull, obviously preventing Oney from realizing that the
robber had a shaved head. He also believed he saw long, straight hair
sticking out of the bottom of the beanie, although Defendant had none at
the time of his arrest. Again, the mistake does not necessarily demonstrate
that Oney lacked sufficient opportunity to make a reliable identification.
Defendant’s expert recognized that perception and ability to pick out
features may change based on any number of factors, including distance
and lighting. R358:54-57. Here, the close proximity of the men’s faces
during the initial seconds of their interaction, Oney’s fixation on the
robber’s face, and the multidirectional lighting both at the car door and
outside, either individually or combined, could be expected to obscure some
features but not others. Defendant’s expert did not rule out the possibility
that, in the right lighting, a stand-up collar on the robber’s shirt or jacket
could give the impression of long, straight hair. See R358:57.
Finally, Oney’s repeated assertion that the robber wore a black leather
coat strengthened his credibility. Oney consistently explained throughout
this case that the robber wore a longish black coat, beginning with his first
report to police and continuing through trial.

He also maintained that

Defendant was wearing the coat when he identified Defendant at the arrest
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site. It is true that the jacket did not make it through processing at the jail
and, hence, could not be produced at trial. But two officers who dealt with
Defendant at the arrest site also testified that he was wearing a black jacket.
Their testimony not only corroborated Oney’s description but reinforces the
fact that Oney’s close proximity to the robber, the indirect lighting and
Oney’s focus on the robber’s face and hands provided him with ample
opportunity to accurately view the robber.
(b) Degree of attention Oney gave to robber.
The second witnessing condition is the witness’s “degree of
attention” to the perpetrator at the time of the crime. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at
781. Relevant factors include when the witness becomes aware that a crime
is being committed, the amount and type of attention that the witness gives
to the perpetrator, and the presence of distractions that may draw a
witness’s attention away from the perpetrator, e.g., noises or other activity.
See id. (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 423). Distractions may include the presence
or use of a weapon, which laboratory research has shown may result in
modest impairment to identification accuracy. 7 Wells, Memon, & Penrod,
Although the Court in Long and Ramirez placed distractions under
the “opportunity to observe” factor, it is more appropriately analyzed here
because distractions do not deprive the witness of the opportunity to
observe; rather, they compete for the witness’s attention during that
window of opportunity.
7
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supra, at 53. On the other hand, the findings of field research on weapon
focus have been “somewhat conflicting.” Id.
Oney’s awareness of the robber was immediate, with the robber
physically placing himself in Oney’s face while Oney sat in the confines of
his driver’s seat. Oney’s attention focused solely on Defendant from that
moment and remained there throughout the entire ordeal. The robber did
not run or attempt to hide but remained facing Oney without a disguise.
Until the robber stood, Oney gave him his full attention without
concern for either a weapon or any criminal conduct: the robber had Oney’s
full attention. Although the robber reached for the handle of something
once he stood up, he did not withdraw the item and at no time did he
brandish, let alone use, a weapon. Oney noticed the movement, which
prompted him to include the robber’s hands in his visual field and to
formulate a mental escape plan. He did not look away from the robber,
however, and he remained so focused on the robber that his memory
included the robber’s conversation.

No external noises or distractions

prompted Oney to divert or diminish his attention on the robber.
(c) Oney’s capacity to observe the robber given the nature
of the event.
The final witnessing condition is the witness’s capacity to reliably
identify the perpetrator given the nature of the event being observed and
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the witness’s physical and mental acuity. Long, 721 P.2d at 493. Relevant
factors include the witness’s age (research has shown that very young
children and the elderly perform worse than other adults); the witness’s
physical limitations, such as uncorrected visual defects, fatigue, injury,
intoxication, or extremely low intelligence; the witness’s emotional state; the
witness’s personal motivations, biases, or prejudices; the distinctiveness of
the perpetrator’s appearance; and the race of the witness relative to the race
of the perpetrator. See id.; see also Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22. Also
relevant is whether the witness’s capacity to observe was impaired by stress
or fright at the time of the observation. Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ¶32 n.22.
Oney’s physical abilities were not in any way impaired at the time of
the robbery. He had not been drinking, there was no evidence of fatigue,
and he was wearing his glasses at the time. R357:108-09. There was no
evidence of any other mental or physical concerns or limitation that would
adversely affect his capacity to reliably identify the robber. Neither was
there evidence of “weapon-focus effect” that tends to decrease the reliability
of eyewitness identification. See R358:26-32; Wells & Olson, at 282, supra.
There was no weapon or other express threat used in the robbery. Oney
believed the robber reached for what might have been a weapon at one
point, but no weapon was ever produced. In any event, prior to that time,
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Oney had no reason to suspect the robber possessed a weapon.

And

regardless of that possibility, Oney remained calm and in control through
the remainder of the encounter, quickly creating and executing an escape
plan and calmly talking to the robber until he succeeded in his escape.
Additionally,

nothing

in

the

circumstances

surrounding

the

identification or involving Oney himself suggests that he suffered such a
heightened degree of stress that it rendered his identification suspect. See
R358:26-32. While Oney was surprised at the robber’s sudden appearance,
nothing about the situation at that point suggested he suffered any undue
stress from the man’s presence: he simply thought the robber might want a
drink or a ride.

R357:18. It was nowhere near the hightened stress of

Ramirez, where the witness was struck once and nearly twice with a pipe,
was continually threatened with the pipe while another robber pointed a
gun at him and issued more threats. 817 P.2d at 783. Arguably, under the
circumstances, any fear Oney harbored did not raise to even the “ordinary
fear” of a victim, which would not prevent the accurate observation and
perception of events. State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 228 (Utah App. 1998)
(victim’s ordinary fear is not alone sufficient to defeat the third Ramirez
factor).
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Finally, Oney did not have the same racial background as Defendant,
which may create a slightly higher risk of misidentification. See R358:58;
Wells & Olson, at 280-81 (despite extensive examination, “no consistent
overall differences attributable to race have emerged;” we simply know
people are better able to recognize faces of their own race). On the other
hand, a witness’s prior exposure to the offender’s race is a factor to be
considered in assessing their ability to make an accurate identification.
R358:49.
Oney was forty years old, had lived in the same area for fourteen or
fifteen years, and had lived in the same neighborhood for two. R357:15-16,
100-01. A number of his neighbors were Hispanic, including those on either
side and across the street, giving him an easy familiarity with their features.
R357:44.

His familiarity with the characteristics of Hispanics generally

would tend to counter concerns of cross-racial bias. The court of appeals
made no mention of this fact, however. Instead, the majority of that court
determined that Oney’s close, unobscured exposure to the robber’s entire
face was a barrier to an accurate identification of the robber solely because
of the concern for cross-racial bias.

Proper consideration of Oney’s

familiarity with Defendant’s race along with the duration and proximity of
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the viewing in the lighted confines of the car door weigh in favor of a
reliable identification.
***
In sum, the witnessing conditions were not so poor as to create a due
process concern.

The witnessing conditions were better than those in

Ramirez, where most of the gunman’s face was covered with a scarf and the
witness was the object of an assault and threatened assault with a gun.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-83. Indeed, the witnessing conditions were, in most
respects, much better than those in most crimes—the robber was wearing
distinctive clothing but no mask, brandished no weapon, made no threats,
and approached the victim in close proximity under numerous light
sources. When these witnessing conditions are weighed against the arrestsite showup, it cannot be said that there was a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification. Accordingly, any reliability concerns were
properly left for the jury to decide.
Indeed, the jury had before it all the tools necessary to assess the
reliability of Oney’s identification testimony: the testimony of the defense
expert on factors affecting the reliability of identifications, a jury instruction
on point, and the argument of both counsel in closing, all of which informed
the jurors in their consideration of the identification evidence. Defendant
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adduced the expert’s testimony objection-free and without limitation and
argued his testimony in closing. Defendant took advantage of every
opportunity provided for testing the reliability of the evidence and
influencing the jury’s consideration of it.

Thus, even though the showup

was arguably as suggestive as the one conducted in Ramirez, the
identification was subject to comprehensive scrutiny by the jury, in keeping
with the continuing development of eyewitness memory science in the
years since Ramirez.
II.
IN ANY EVENT, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT
If, as the State contends, Oney’s identification was sufficiently reliable
to be presented to the jury for their deliberation, this Court’s review is
ended, and the court of appeals’ decision should be reversed. See Point I,
supra.

If, however, this Court determines that under the appropriate

application of Ramirez, there was “a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification” requiring exclusion of the identification
testimony, it must determine whether the error was harmless. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. at 116 (quotation omitted).
This Court has yet to squarely decide whether the harmless error
standard applicable to a preserved state constitutional error in admission of
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eyewitness identification testimony is the erosion of confidence standard or
the stricter federal “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The
court of appeals’ majority determined that the error must be reviewed
under the same standard that applies to federal constitutional due process
errors. 2015 UT App. 199, ¶16 & n.2 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967)). They did so based on this Court’s recognition in Ramirez that
Utah’s state constitutional due process analysis “is certainly as stringent as”
the federal analysis. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶16, n.2. However, this Court
went on to require that Ramirez demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result had the identification not been admitted.” Ramirez,
817 P.2d at 788. The same standard has since been repeatedly applied. See
State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997); see also State v. Clopten,
2009 UT 84, ¶39.
Because the issue of whether the burden shifts to the State to prove
that a preserved state constitutional error in admission of eyewitness
identification testimony is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter
of first impression, it should be decided by this Court. See Utah R. App. P.
46(a)(4). See also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶16, n.2 (explaining majority’s
reasoning for applying federal prejudice standard without prior direction
by this Court).
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There is, however, no reason to reach that issue in this case because
even assuming application of the federal standard, any error in admitting
Oney’s identifications was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Factors that determine whether an error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt include “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the
prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
absence of evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.”
State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (quotation omitted).
Even without Oney’s identification of Defendant, the jury would still
have the benefit of his description of the robber, the bases for his
description—unchallenged by expert testimony criticizing the reliability of
his observations—and corroboration from Officer Bias that he believed
Defendant matched the description and from both Officer Bias and Officer
Deven Mayer that Defendant was wearing a black jacket when he was
found.

The prosecutor would provide the same explanations for the

discrepancies involving the hair, goatee, and black jacket. The jury would
also have the string of events that led the officers to the car and the school
yard within minutes of the robbery, the dog’s immediate discernment of a

-51-

lone scent leading down the pathway and through the school yard in the
very direction officers later found the only person in the area, as well as the
timing of the noise indicating the suspect jumped a fence just as the officer
began following the dog through the school yard.

Officer Bias would

explain how the dog led officers toward the school but was stopped short of
the school to do a safety sweep of the portable classrooms that they
necessarily passed on their way to the school. 8

Instead of waiting to

complete the sweep, Officer Bias continued in the direction the dog had
indicated, rounded a corner of the school, and found Defendant. Moreover,
despite establishing an immediate containment zone, no one but Defendant
was found anywhere in the area.
In addition, the jury would hear the circumstances surrounding
Defendant’s discovery and arrest at the school, including the indications
that he was hiding in an out-of-the-way place requiring the use of a
flashlight to see him, the fact that he stared at the officers while refusing to
obey their repeated commands to come out of the unit yet claimed

The court of appeals’ majority suggests that the dog led the officers
to the classrooms and stopped instead of leading them to the school. 2015
UT App 199, ¶18. That interpretation is not supported by the record
evidence. R357:128-29, 145-47; R359:17-18, 26-28; State’s Exhs. 27 & 28. The
dog was stopped for safety reasons at outbuildings located on their path to
the school. Nothing suggests the dog initiated the stop.
8

-52-

thereafter that he called police to come to his aid. Those circumstances
strongly suggest that Defendant was hiding from the visible police
presence. Further, he was found in possession of a knife, corroborating
Oney’s testimony that he reached for something tucked in his waistband.
And finally, they would have the condemningly similar words uttered by
the robber and by Defendant that someone was “following me.”
Given this compelling evidence, any error in the admission of Oney’s
identification testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
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